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Faculty and Deans

NO ACCOUNTING FOR SCHOOL VOUCHERS
James G. Dwyer*

The standard conservative view of privatization in education
favors state funding of private schools, religious and nonreligious,
without state oversight to ensure accountability for how the money
is used.1 The standard liberal view opposes state funding of private
schools regardless of whether there is state oversight to ensure that
the funding improves children's secular education. 2 I take the
intermediate position that states may provide funding for private
schooling but only if they also regulate and oversee the private
schools sufficiently to ensure that the state money has the effect of
improving the secular education that the schools provide. In fact, I
maintain that states should have school voucher programs with
robust accountability mechanisms, both to respect the equality right
of children whose parents place them in private schools and to
incentivize private schools, some of which are educationally
inadequate, to accept state oversight. In this Article, I highlight the
main points against the standard views, critique the prevailing
assumptions about what accountability entails, and assess to what
extent there is real educational accountability in voucher programs
today.
Two preliminary definitional matters: First, I use the term
"school voucher program" to encompass any scheme by which the
*

Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. I

am grateful to Professor Omari Scott Simmons for hosting and inviting me to an
excellent symposium and for sharing with me his insights on the topic of this
Article. Thanks also to the Wake Forest Law Review editors who assisted with
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1. See JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED
APPROACH TO EDUCATION REFORM 41-43 (2002). There is, of course, no single
uniform view among conservatives or liberals. I refer here to views that prevail
in the political debate. There has been substantial support for vouchers among
parents in poor communities simply because they are parents seeking some
better alternative for their children, not because of their political views.
2. See id. at 43-46; Terry M. Moe & Paul T. Hill, Moving to a Mixed
Model, in THE FUTURES OF SCHOOL REFORM 65, 91-92 (Jal Mehta et al. eds.,
2012); Gary Scharrer & Peggy Fikac, Houston Lawmaker Expected to Revive
Fight over School
Vouchers, HOUS. CHRON.
(Oct. 4,
2012),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/School-voucher-fight-expected
-for-next-session-3920840.php (describing the polarized debate in the Texas
legislature over vouchers).
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state chooses to have money that it would otherwise collect and use
for public purposes instead go to private schools at the election of
some private party. It therefore includes the stereotypical voucher
program by which the state gives money directly to private schools
to pay for the tuition of specific children whose parents have
successfully applied for such public funding of their children's
education. 3 But it also includes transfers of public money to private
schools through the income tax system. One way some states use
the tax system is to reimburse parents for their private school
tuition payments, in whole or in part, by means of tax credits or
deductions. 4 More commonly, states reimburse any taxpayer who
makes donations to a private school or to a private school
scholarship fund by means of tax credits or deductions. 5 All of these
programs entail a state decision to divert to private schools funds
that are in the state's possession or that are owed to the state. On
this broader view of "vouchers," currently there are voucher
programs for regular education in fourteen states and the District of
7
Columbia, 6 and the number will undoubtedly keep growing.
Second, I refer in this Article to "secular education" as the aim
of state decision making about funding and regulation of any school.
Rather than defining that concept with precision here, I will simply
stipulate for purposes of this Article that what I mean is basically
what public schools provide-that is, mainstream views and

3. It is a common misperception or mischaracterization that voucher
programs entail transfer of state money to parents. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson
& David E. Campbell, Introduction:A New Direction in Public Education?, in
CHARTERS, VOUCHERS & PUBLIC EDUCATION 1, 10, 13 (Paul E. Peterson & David
E. Campbell eds., 2001) (saying "government assistance is given to parents, not
directly to schools" and mentioning "the money given to families"). In reality,
parents who qualify for vouchers receive vouchers, not money. A voucher is a
piece of paper that effectively says to whichever school parents select for their
child: "We, the state, will pay for all or part of this child's tuition. You, the
school, enroll this child and then send us this piece of paper, and then we, the
state, will send you, the private school, money from the public treasury." See,
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:4015(5) (Supp. 2012); id. § 17:4017(A); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 3301-11-10(A) (2009).
4. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.12(2)(b) (West 2011).
5. E.g., id. § 422.11S.
6. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra notes 54-56, 77-84, 99, 101, 108, and
accompanying text. There is an additional group of states with programs for
state funding of just special education in private schools. See, e.g., THE AM.
FED'N. FOR CHILDREN, SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK 2011-12, at 56 (2012),
available at http://www.federationforchildren.org/system/uploads/181/original
/North-Carolina.pdf?1328559425.
7. See Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. Ass'n, The Year of School Choice: 42 States
Consider School Vouchers, Scholarship Tax Credits in 2011 (June 16, 2011),
http://astoa.com/201 1/the-year-of-school-choice-42-states-consider-school
-vouchers- scholarship-tax-credits-in-201 1/.
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methodologies in math, reading and writing, and the physical and
social sciences.
I take for granted that the state cannot
constitutionally aim to support religious instruction per se.
Available evidence suggests, though, that most religious schools aim
to provide a good secular education for students, as well as to impart
religious beliefs and values. 8 The division between the two might
not always be neat in practice; the same lesson might do both.
Nevertheless, a religious school could accomplish all that the state
expects of its public schools and simply supplement that with
instruction in the beliefs of a particular religious faith. 9
Part I of the Article provides basic details about elementary and
secondary schooling in America and about state regulation of the
public and private sectors apart from voucher programs. Part II
identifies a number of bad arguments commonly made for or against
school vouchers. Part III explains how a child-centered view leads
to a "vouchers with strings" position. Part IV then describes the
many and varied current voucher programs around the United
States. Finally, Part V assesses whether any of these programs
include measures to ensure that participating schools are providing
a good secular education. Throughout the Article, I highlight
various fallacies that confound rational deliberation about the
morality, legality, and policy wisdom of voucher programs.
I. BASIC FACTS ABOUT AMERICAN SCHOOLS

Eighty-six percent of children in the United States attend public
schools. 10 Eleven percent attend private schools, and three percent
are homeschooled.11 Among private schools, seventy-seven percent
are religious, and twenty-three percent are nonsectarian. 2 Popular
perception of the public and private school sectors betrays certain
fallacies.
Fallacy 1: Private schools are legally required to demonstrate
academic adequacy. Reality: In contrast to the extensive state
regulation of public schools, there is no meaningful mandatory

8. See, e.g., Derek Neal, The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on

EducationalAchievement, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 98, 98-100 (1997).
9.

But see MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 158

(1999) (suggesting that any religious instruction is inherently contrary to
students' interest in developing autonomy).
10. Table 41. Percentage Distribution of Students Ages 5 Through 17
Attending KindergartenThrough 12th Grade, by School Type or Participationin
Homeschooling and Selected Child, Parent, and Household Characteristics:
1999, 2003, and 2007, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov
/programs/digest/dl 1/tables/dtl 1_041.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
11. Id.
12. Table A-5-3. Percentage Distribution of Students Enrolled in Private
Elementary and Secondary Schools, by School Type and Selected
Characteristics: 2009-10, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov
/programs/coe/tables/table-pri-3.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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regulation or state oversight of private schools in America. 13 Typical
state code provisions pertaining to private schools require merely
that the schools report attendance to the state and profess to teach
certain core subjects. 14 The state does not know whether and how
private schools actually teach anything, and it might explicitly
disavow any intent to constrain the content of curriculum or to
conflict in any way with religious beliefs. 15 Private schools do not
have to administer standardized tests or use any other academic
assessment tools. If they choose to administer tests, they do not
have to report the results to anyone. Moreover, the state places no
restrictions on how private schools treat students beyond the
prohibitions on physically harmful conduct that apply to all
custodians of children. Thus, for example, private schools may
freely treat female students in a subordinating manner, refusing to
allow them to occupy leadership roles and discouraging them from
studying certain subjects or aspiring to college attendance. 16
Fallacy 2: Private schools are better than public schools.
Reality: This is a common, but hopelessly nonsensical, assertion.' 7
It implicitly supposes that (a) all private schools are the same and
all public schools are the same and (b) someone has reliably
assessed the quality of "the private school" and "the public school"
and determined the former to be superior. Neither supposition is
true.
Preoccupation with average school sector test scores is one of
the most prominent and puzzling aspects of public and scholarly
debates over voucher programs.' 8
What policy decision could

13. See James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions
to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protectionto Children
of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1338 (1996). Some states offer
state approval for schools that wish to receive it.
14. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.080 (LexisNexis 2009).
15. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 118.165(1)(d) (West Supp. 2012) ("The
program provides a sequentially progressive curriculum of fundamental
instruction in reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies, science and
health. This subsection does not require the program to include in its
curriculum any concept, topic or practice in conflict with the program's religious
doctrines or to exclude from its curriculum any concept, topic or practice
consistent with the program's religious doctrines.").
16. For evidence that this occurs, see JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 26-27 (1998). See also Barbara Miner, School Vouchers:

A Threat to the Rights of Women and Gays, RETHINKING

SCHOOLS

(Feb. 2002),

http://www.rethinkingschools.org/special-reports/voucher-report/vgay.shtml.
17. See, e.g., Peterson & Campbell, supra note 3, at 7-8 (stating that the
impetus for voucher programs came in the 1980s and 1990s in large part from
reaction to studies purporting to show "performance" in Catholic schools-or in
private schools, more generally-relative to public schools); Facts and Studies,
COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC. (CAPE), http://www.capenet.org/facts.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).

18. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene, The Hidden Research Consensus for School
Choice, in CHARTERS, VOUCHERS & PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 85-90;
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possibly depend on whether the average test scores for the private
school sector are a certain number of points above or below the
average test scores for the public school sector? Within each sector,
there is enormous variation in quality, and sector averages tell us
nothing about the degree or distribution of variance from the mean.
Extraordinarily good results among, for example, elite private
academies would mask performance far below the mean among
other private schools. State education policy would be entirely
irrational if it reacted to sector averages rather than to the actual
quality of individual schools. If a state reacted only to average
scores for an entire sector, then it should conclude that all is well
with public schools because the average score for the public school
sector is never much different from that for the private schools
included in these studies. 19 Yet that would be absurd because we
know that some public schools are not functioning adequately. The
results for the worst public schools would be masked by those for the
best public schools.
Thus, it makes no more sense to say that the state should fund
all private schools because the average test scores for private schools
are similar to, or somewhat better than, the average for public
schools than it would be to say that the state should not fund any
private schools because the average test scores for public schools are
similar to the average for private schools. There is every reason to
suppose, and published evidence to confirm, that some private
schools, like some public schools, are grossly deficient
academically. 20 The hard question voucher proponents have never
been willing to face is whether it is appropriate for the state to
divert funds to those bad private schools, to facilitate children's
continued enrollment in or transfer to such schools, and to do so
without any state oversight to ensure that such schools use the state
funding to improve the secular education they provide.

Jim McLaughlin, Audit Questions Impact of Voucher Schools on Test Scores,
MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL
(Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news
/education/audit-questions-impact-of-voucher-schools-on-test-scores- 116mcbs168088946.html.
19. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMPARING PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND
PUBLIC SCHOOLS USING HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING, at iv-v (2006),

available at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2006461.pdf;
Harold Wenglinsky, Are Private High Schools Better Academically than Public
High
Schools?,
CENTER
ON
EDUC.
POL'Y
(Oct.
10,
2007),
http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=121.
20. See DWYER, supra note 1, at 171-75; School Vouchers: The Emerging
Track Record, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, http://www.nea.orglbare/print.html?content=
/bare/16970.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (relating an article published by an
Ohio paper that reported a fundamentalist Christian school in Cleveland did
not employ teachers but rather used state voucher money to buy religious
videos that pupils spent most of the school day watching).
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In fact, it is unlikely that voucher advocates would change their
position if faced with undeniable evidence that average test scores
for private schools are worse than average test scores for public
schools. And they should not. That evidence would in no way
undermine the claim that some children would be much better off
transferring from their local public school to a particular private
school in their locale. Likewise, evidence that students in private
schools on average score higher on certain tests than students in
public schools would in no way support a claim that children in bad
public schools would benefit from transferring to whatever private
school their parents might choose. If some private schools are also
academically inadequate, it would be irrational and contrary to the
aim of improving education for the state to facilitate transfer of any
child from any public school to such a private school.
There are, in fact, studies finding better performance on
average in public schools. One study comparing public school eighth
grade National Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP") scores
with scores for charter schools and for various denominations that
operate private schools found that only Lutheran schools and
charter schools performed better than their public-school
counterparts, and only slightly. 21 It found that Conservative
Christian schools performed the worst, followed by Catholic
schools. 22 But even at this greater level of detail-breaking private
schools out into ideological subgroups-policy makers should not
rely on average results across a large number of schools, because

that says nothing about the nature of any particular school. There
is no question that some Catholic schools, for example, are far better

than some public schools, and it would be sensible for the state to
facilitate transfer of some students from public to Catholic school
where that would mean movement to an academically superior
school.
Moreover, test score averages are also quite misleading, even as
to average sector performance, for at least two reasons. First, as
noted above, states do not require private schools to administer
achievement tests, so private schools that do administer tests have
done so because they want to, which obviously creates a selection
bias in the comparative analysis. Second, some existing tests,
perhaps most, simply do not measure for good education and might
in fact reward bad education-in particular, a monotonous diet of

21. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supranote 19.
22. Id. A separate study by the National Center for Educational Statistics
indicated that Conservative Christian schools employ a comparably low
percentage of certified teachers. See Private Schools in the United States: A
Statistical Profile, 1993-94/Other Religious Conservative Christian Schools,
NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/ps/97459ch3.asp (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013) (explaining that "44 percent of conservative Christian
school teachers did not hold a state teaching certificate").
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rote memorization. 23 With respect to some existing tests, the fact
that a particular school, public or private, does very well on them
actually supports a conclusion that the school is academically
inferior. A curriculum oriented around bad tests is likely to be a bad
curriculum.
II. BAD ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES
Debate about school vouchers is largely polarized, with political
conservatives promoting them and political liberals opposing them.
On both sides, thinking is predominantly adult centered, despite the
fact that the schooling at issue is for children. 24 The conservative
position, favoring vouchers without regulatory strings, originated in
a pro-religion, parents'-rights, and antistate outlook. 25 The liberal
position might be motivated in part by a child-centered concern that
voucher programs will result in the destruction of public school
systems, without really enabling poor parents to send their children
to decent private schools, or will result in resegregation. But there
is reason to suspect that much of the liberal opposition reflects
sympathy for teachers and administrators in the public school
system and an antireligion sentiment.
Indeed, most political
opposition comes from powerful teachers' unions, and most court
challenges are predicated on a supposed right of taxpayers not to
have their money go to religious institutions, regardless of whether
those religious institutions are providing a better secular education
for children. 26 The reasoning on both sides is plagued by explicit or
implicit normative positions that are untenable.

23. See Jonathan Kozol, Confections of Apartheid Continue in Our Schools,
71 EDUC. DIG. 4, 17-19 (2006); Harvey Siegel, High Stakes Testing, Educational
Aims and Ideals, and Responsible Assessment, 3 THEORY &RES. EDUC. 219, 22429 (2004); Howard Blume, Focus on Standardized Tests May Be Pushing Some
Teachers to Cheat, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com
/2011/nov/O7locallla-me-teacher-cheating-20111107; How Standardized Testing
Damages Education, FAIRTEST (Aug. 20, 2007), http://fairtest.org
/facts/howharm.htm; Michael Winerip, Teaching Beyond the Test, to Make Room
Again
for
Current Events,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
22,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/nyregion/teaching-beyond-test-with-eye-on
-current-events.html?_r=0.
24. See DWYER, supra note 1, at 1-2, 41-46, 48-55.

25. See James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story
of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 563-66 (2007). Forman
explains how conservative voucher proponents ultimately realized that they
would have greater political success if they deployed racial justice rhetoric and
enlisted minority community leaders to join the voucher movement. Id. at 56873.
26. See id. at 573-77; The Case Against Vouchers, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N,
http://www.nea.org/home/19133.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The explicit
basis for taxpayer suits is the Establishment Clause requirement that the state
remain separate from religion, but taxpayer standing to bring such suits rests
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Fallacy 3 Parents who choose private schools for their children
have an equality right to state funding of their children's schooling.
Reality: Although voucher proponents frequently voice this
normative claim, it is telling that none have ever brought equal
27
protection suits against states that do not have voucher programs.
Such a suit would be dead on arrival. The obvious state response is
that it provides to all citizens, without discrimination, certain
educational resources, including museums, libraries, and public
schools, and that if some citizens decline for whatever reason to use
those resources, the state has no obligation to give them money
instead. I might refuse to use the local public library because it
contains books I think are evil, provides educational programs that
promote values I reject, and allows equal access to people I view as
infidels. Does that mean I have an equality right to a public
voucher to use at a private library? Do biblical literalists who refuse
to enter the Smithsonian's National Museum of Natural History
have an equal protection right to state funding of a creationism
museum? No court would say so.
Some voucher advocates might respond that the state should
not be using taxpayer money to create and operate ideologically
nonneutral educational institutions of any sort. If the state insists
on doing so, they might maintain that it does in fact have an
obligation to fund ideologically alternative educational institutions.
An argument along these lines for abolishing the public school
system and moving to complete privatization would have some
purchase if public schools, public museums, and public libraries
could plausibly be characterized as authoritarian indoctrinatory
institutions, aiming to impose a particular orthodoxy on children
and other members of society and to prevent them from questioning
that orthodoxy. Then these so-called educational institutions would
begin to look like instruments of an established church and contrary
to a core constitutional prohibition. But that characterization is
simply not plausible. Although public schools inevitably have
curricular elements that implicitly favor, or could be viewed as
favoring, a particular moral view, they also have intrinsic aspects
today that prevent them from becoming oppressive indoctrinatory
institutions-for example, openness to attendance by all resident
children, transparency requirements for school administrators and
school boards, fora for parent complaints, susceptibility to oversight
by and challenge at several levels of elected government and in
courts, and employment laws that constrain a school district's choice
on a supposition that lack of separation is an offense to any taxpayer. See, e.g.,
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 113 S. Ct. 1436, 1445-47 (2011).
27. Parents did bring unsuccessful equal protection claims against a
voucher program in Maine that was limited to secular private schools, claiming
discrimination based on religion. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st
Cir. 1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 147-48 (Me. 1999).
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of teachers and administrators. Moreover, there are sound publicgoods arguments for maintaining state-operated, taxpayer-funded
schools, just as there are for maintaining public highways and a
government-operated military-other government programs that
inevitably do things that some citizens find morally offensive or
contrary to their religious beliefs. 28 Equality norms simply do not
support mandatory state financing of private analogues to every
government operation.
Fallacy 4: Consumer (i.e., parent) choice leads to better education
for children. Reality: Few parents are competent to judge the
academic worth of a school, and a significant percentage of parents
who choose religious schools for their children simply place little or
29
no value on secular education.
What I call the "myth of parental omniscience" surfaces often in
advocacy for vouchers and for parental power to direct children's
upbringing without state interference. 30 In reality, there is no more
reason to expect parents in general to be capable of assessing the
quality of teaching in a school than to expect them to be capable of
assessing the quality of medical practices in hospitals. The poor
parents who are typically the first participants in a voucher
program are likely to have little education themselves and to
operate at a lower cognitive level on average. 31 Why would anyone
think them capable of investigating and analyzing the relative
educational merits of different schools?

28. See TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 1719 (2001) (citing the work of Milton Friedman).
29. See Mark Schneider & Jack Buckley, What Do Parents Want from
Schools? Evidence from the Internet, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS
133, 133-34 (2002) ("The Carnegie Foundation concluded that 'many parents
base their school choice decision on factors that have nothing to do with the
quality of education'....
A Twentieth Century Fund report argued that
parents are not 'natural consumers of education' and that 'few parents of any
social class appear willing to acquire the information necessary to make active
and informed educational choices."').
30. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on School Choice: Are
Participating Private Schools Held Accountable?, FRIEDMAN FOUND.,
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/School-Choice-FAQs/School-Choice-FAQs
-Are-participating-private-schools-held-accountable.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2013). Indeed, even the Louisiana Superintendent of Education has recited this
mantra. See Stephanie Simon, Louisiana's Bold Bid to Privatize Schools,
REUTERS (June 1, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/01/us-education
-vouchers-idUSL1E8H1OAG20120601; see also Moe & Hill, supra note 2, at 69,
71, 80-81, 91 (studiously avoiding reference to "parental choice" in a recent
paper arguing for expansion and multiplication of voucher programs and
instead referring to the problematic concept of family choice and the truly
peculiar idea of child choice).
31.

See

JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR

116 (2007) ("[Mlany researchers have argued that the tendency to make
ill-informed choices is stronger among low-income parents.").
HYPE?
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One might think that any parent can simply compare test
scores at different schools, but (a) that cannot be done with schools
that do not administer tests, (b) as noted above, some tests are bad
tests, and (c) we certainly cannot expect the average parent, let
alone disadvantaged parents, to distinguish good tests from bad
tests. Reliance on word of mouth among parents in the community
only replicates the problems of parental incompetence: why rely on
what any other particular parent says about the academic quality of
a school? Parents might be able to identify schools that are safer or
friendlier for their children, and those things are important, but
there is no reason to think parents in general are able to identify
good curriculum or teaching. Evidence of the potential for parents
to be hoodwinked comes from exposure of widespread fraud and
32
abuse in some existing charter and voucher programs.
In addition to attributing pedagogical expertise to all parents,
voucher proponents more plausibly attribute to parents a strong
motivation to do what is best for their children-a motivation that
might well be lacking in state actors, including some public school
administrators and teachers. There are several problems, however,
with relying on parental motivation. First, parents' love for their
children can make them more vulnerable to scams; fearing for their
children's future, they might grasp at false promises from
unregulated private school operators.
Second, religion, which is central to the thinking of many
voucher proponents, confounds the "parental choice produces better
education" argument on which their position rests. It does so in part
because religion is likely to generate a motivation-namely,
obligation to religious authority per se-that can compete with the
motivation to do what is best for one's child. The Old Testament
story of Abraham preparing to kill his son Isaac illustrates this well,
as do the many instances of parents refusing medical care for their
children because their religion forbids them from doing so-for
example, Jehovah's Witnesses who adhere to what they regard as a
33
biblical command not to allow blood transfusions.
The clearer problem, though, is that even if solely focused on
what is best for their children, some parents make choices for their
children as a matter of principle that the state must view as
harmful. This is so because some parents' religion tells them that
mainstream education is of less value than certain incompatible
spiritual needs or is even inherently immoral. More concretely,
some parents simply reject, as contrary to their religious outlook,
32. See, e.g., Gus Garcia-Roberts, McKay Scholarship Program Sparks a
Cottage Industry of Fraud and Chaos, MIAMI NEW TIMES (June 23, 2011),
http://www.miaminewtimes.con2011-06-23/news/mckay-scholarship-program
-sparks-a-cottage-industry-of-fraud-and-chaos/.
33. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F.
Supp. 488, 502-03 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
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liberal educational aims such as fostering autonomy, creative and
34
critical thinking, and preparing children for an "open future."
Their top priority for their children is unquestioning acceptance of
the parents' religious precepts, and the content of those precepts can
include illiberal values such as female subservience or slaughter of
infidels. They simply do not want their children to receive schooling
that fosters critical thinking, intellectual curiosity and creativity,
and individual expression as well as robust knowledge in secular
subjects. With respect to those parents, whose numbers are simply
unknown, it makes no sense to invoke parental motivation as a
basis for supposing choice programs will improve education. From
the state's perspective, sometimes parents' special concern for their
children harms the children, and parental choice sometimes results
in children being largely deprived of what the state views as an
education. 35
Voucher proponents have yet to address this
undeniable reality.
It makes no sense, therefore, to assert in a debate about state
policy that, by supporting parental choices, the state will secure
better education for children. "Parents know best and care most" is
a nice slogan, but it is belied by the lack of any evidence that the
average parent, let alone a parent in an impoverished community, is
a savvy consumer of schools and by the fact that knowledge and
caring are simply irrelevant in the case of the religious dissenter
who rejects the state's aims for children's education.
important
interests
at
Fallacy 5: Taxpayers
have
schools.
Reality:
Federal
stake when public money goes to religious
constitutional challenges to voucher programs have likely rested on
the Establishment Clause primarily because, at least from an adultcentered perspective, it is difficult to conceive of any other federal
constitutional basis for challenging the programs. 36 Taxpayers
sometimes won before the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris37 and Arizona Christian School Tuition

34. See DWYER, supra note 16, at 17. The same is true of homeschooling.
See J.C. Blokhuis, Book Review, 8 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 322, 322-26 (2010)
(reviewing ROBERT KUNZMAN, WRITE THESE LAWS ON YOUR CHILDREN: INSIDE THE
WORLD OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN HOMESCHOOLING

(2009)).

35. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229 (1972) ("[T]he
State . . argues that a decision exempting Amish children from the State's
requirement fails to recognize the substantive right of the Amish child to a
secondary education .. ").
36. Some state constitutions contain prohibitions on funding of private
schooling that operate similarly to some Federal Establishment Clause cases.
See generally Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State
Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 573-86 (2003). I present a child-centered basis for
challenging existing programs in DWYER, supra note 1, at 198-210.
37. 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002) (rejecting an Establishment Clause
challenge to the Cleveland voucher program).
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Organization v. Winn, 3s but generally not because judges felt great
concern about taxpayers' well-being or attributed to them a
fundamental right. 39 In reality, no individual adult has especially
important interests at stake in the voucher debate, and arguably
least of all secularist taxpayer bystanders who object to "their
money" going to religious institutions.40 I am a secularist taxpayer,
and if my state began paying the salaries of Catholic priests, I would
be quite annoyed, I would believe that to be highly improper, and it
might even make me feel that current government officials view me,
because I am not Catholic, as a second-class citizen. But my
negative feelings and beliefs about that would hardly threaten my
basic well-being. In fact, the state is already subsidizing religion by
granting income and property tax exemptions to churches, but no
one is going mad because of that, and no taxpayers' lives have
unraveled as a result. Separation of church and state is an
important structural value, but it is implausible to say that any
individual, as a taxpayer or simply as a citizen, has an important
interest at stake in a state decision about one particular government
program that helps religious institutions operate, when that
program entails no real direct threat to bystander citizens' own
freedom of conscience or conduct.
Conversely, children have a great interest at stake in education
policy decision making, and the real problem with states subsidizing
religious indoctrination is that it causes more children to be
subjected to such indoctrination. For some children, whether there
is a voucher program is of little consequence. This includes those
who are currently attending an adequate public school and whose
parents would use a voucher to send them to a private school that is
not significantly better. It also includes those who are already
attending a private school and whose secular education would not be
much improved by the availability of state funding because the
school and its customer parents already have ample resources for
what they are trying to accomplish. But other children might have a
great deal at stake. One such group contains those stuck in very
bad public schools whose parents would transfer them to a good
private school if a voucher were available. Another such group
contains children whose parents have placed them in a private
school that strives to provide a good secular education but that has
too few resources to fulfill that aim. These latter groups of children
have more important interests at stake in the voucher debate than

38. 113 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge
an Arizona tuition tax credit); see DWYER, supranote 1, at 115-24.
39. But cf. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871 (2000)) (characterizing forced contribution
to religious instruction as a unique affront to individuals' conscience).
40. See James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public into the
Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963, 968-71 (2001).
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any adult who could possibly be affected by a voucher program, and
so they presumptively should be the main focus of everyone involved
in the debate. Both sides of the debate express concern for children
in bad public schools, but that appears disingenuous when (a) both
sides take categorical positions, with one side insisting that the
state pay for parents to transfer their children to any unregulated
school they want and the other side refusing to consider any reform
proposal that includes devoting some public money to private
schooling, and (b) neither side manifests any concern for children
who are receiving a poor education in private school solely because
of a lack of resources.
Fallacy 6: Any voucher program that includes religious schools
necessarily entails illicit state payment for religious instruction and
worship. Reality: This
view
betrays
a lack
of economic
sophistication
and an unwarranted
Establishment
Clause
absolutism. Imagine a private school that is owned by a religious
organization, has a religious name, and employs some clergy, but
whose facility and operations are indistinguishable from a
nonsectarian private or public school.
There are no religious
symbols, religious lessons, or religious activities. A state subsidy for
that school cannot plausibly be characterized as payment for
religious instruction or worship. Now suppose that that school hires
one teacher just to provide religious instruction and offers a
catechism elective to students.
All costs associated with that
instruction add up to one percent of the school's expenses. If the
amount of state subsidy to the school equals ninety-nine percent or
less of the school's expenses, then as a conceptual matter we can
view the state as paying only for secular education. Private money
is paying for the religious instruction. To this some might respond
that the state subsidy "frees up" private money to pay for religious
instruction, so the state is financially aiding religious teaching. But
whether a state payment for secular activities enables private
individuals to spend their private money on religious activities is
normatively irrelevant. Otherwise, every government program of
assistance to any private entity for any secular purpose would have
to be viewed as breaching the supposed wall of separation because
an incidental result would always be that private parties could
devote more of their own money to religious activities. For example,
by this line of reasoning the government could no longer distribute
food stamps because food stamps enable poor people to use more of
their money for their church instead of using it to buy food.
Of
course,
most
actual
religious
schools
do
not
compartmentalize so cleanly. Catholic schools, which are still the
largest sector of the private school universe,41 do generally have

41. See Facts and Studies, supra note 17 (showing that forty-three percent
of children attending private school are in Catholic schools).
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separate classes for catechism, but they are typically mandatory.
Other classes are secular in nature, but teachers might begin a class
with a prayer or occasionally make a faith-informed statement to
students-for example, in imposing discipline or in giving an
explanation for some historical event or natural phenomenon. A few
topics that are not essential to preparation for higher education,
such as birth control, might be out of bounds for any class material
or discussion or might be addressed in a religiously tendentious
way. Yet the core of instruction in Catholic schools is secular, and
those schools aim to fully prepare students to attend any university
in the country. It should be possible to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of what portion of the school's budget goes toward secular
instruction and what portion toward religious instruction and to peg
state aid at a level below the estimate for the secular portion.
Modest coloring of the secular portion with religious messages
simply should not concern the state or secularist taxpayers; from an
objective perspective, it is not sufficiently significant to worry about.
The real problem cases are religious schools that are
pervasively religious in the sense that religious tenets substantially
limit or distort the content of instruction and the aim of religious
conformity leads to teaching methods antithetical to cognitive
development and autonomy. 42 In such schools, religious tenets are
also likely to motivate treatment of pupils in ways the state deems
harmful-for example, extreme forms of denigrating and restricting
students and denying girls equal opportunities for learning. 43 The
state should not support such schools primarily because the schools
are not furthering the state's aims for education and in fact are
doing what the state regards as harm to the children, not that the
state aid might give offense to secularist taxpayers.
All existing voucher programs, as discussed further below,
suffer from this latter problem-that they implicitly authorize
payments to pervasively religious schools with aims and practices
contrary to the state's educational goals. The Indiana school
voucher program that the Indiana Supreme Court approved in
Meredith v. Pence,44 for example, explicitly disavows any intention to
constrain the curriculum or pedagogy of participating private
schools, beyond requiring them to profess that they will teach

42. See DWYER, supra note 16, at 16-20, 27-37; Frances Patterson, With
God on Their Side, RETHINKING
SCHOOLS
(Winter 2001/2002),
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/special-reports/voucher-report/v
_god162.shtml (describing extreme bias in religious schools' social studies text
books). For the view that "faith schools" are inherently indoctrinatory, see
generally Michael Hand, A PhilosophicalObjection to Faith Schools, 1 THEORY
& RES. EDUC. 89 (2003).
43. See DWYER, supranote 16, at 21-27, 37-44.
44. 984 N.E.2d 1213 (2013).
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certain subjects, which they are free to do however they wish. 45 The
Indiana program also has the defect of potentially paying for purely
religious components of schools' operations, insofar as it authorizes
state payment to religious schools of a child's entire tuition and not
just a percentage of tuition reflecting the secular education
46
component of a school's operations.
Fallacy 7: Voucher programs undermine public school systems.
Reality: Many voucher opponents, especially teachers' unions,
maintain that voucher programs harm public school systems by
taking money away from them and by skimming off the better
students. The funding aspect should be irrelevant to self-interested
teachers themselves, at least those who are competent; shifting
children from public to private schools means fewer jobs in public
schools but more jobs in private schools, especially in private schools
with new resources from the voucher program. But the unions only
represent public school teachers and presumably do not want to lose
dues-paying members.
In any event, the funding argument is nonsensical. As a
conceptual matter, it makes no more sense to say voucher money
reduces funding for public schools than to say that state spending on
highways reduces funding for public schools. The state collects
taxes and allocates the total among a great variety of programs, and
every expenditure on one program means there is less for others. In
each budget cycle, legislators look at their overall resources and
explicitly or implicitly divide the entire pool among all the programs
they wish to fund.
Funding legislation might specify that
allocations for one program will be reduced dollar for dollar by
whatever amount is spent on another program. But that would be a
political choice with vouchers, not a necessary feature of state
funding of private schools, and implicit in that choice would be a
legislative decision not to increase aggregate spending on education
by taking money away from noneducation programs, such as
highway construction. If past funding of public schools has been
inadequate, and funding of public schools following implementation
of a voucher program remains inadequate, despite the lower student
population in the public schools, then those who want to improve
public schools could just as sensibly argue both before and after the
implementation of a voucher program that the state should increase
taxes or take money away from noneducation programs in order to
bolster the public schools. Indeed, they might be on stronger ground
arguing that the state should take money away from some
budgetary item that is less important than education, rather than
arguing that the state should withhold money from children whose

45. Id. at 1220-21.
46. Id. at 1220 n.7; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-4(1) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012).
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parents put them in private schools in order to shore up funding for
the education of children whose parents put them in public schools.
The former action might be optimal for the public system-the same
amount of money with fewer students to serve, even if those fewer
students are, on average, more challenging. In short, there is no
inherent connection between spending on private schooling and
reduction in spending on public schooling.
The skimming complaint appears plausible. Studies show that
one of the main determinants of educational outcomes for a given
47
child is the quality of the other learners in the school environment.
An at-risk child is more likely to stay in school and progress from
grade to grade if the student population as a whole creates an ethos
of disciplined focus on lessons and academic success. And because
existing voucher programs require some parent initiative, and
possibly up-front tuition money as well (for tax credit programs),
children who exit public schools because of vouchers are likely to be,
on average, better learners because of the role that parental
involvement plays in children's readiness and desire to learn. 48 Yet
studies have generally found that voucher programs have either a
positive effect or no effect at all on public schools, so the empirical
supposition just does not materialize. 49 And there is a normative
problem with this objection as well; it supposes that it is
appropriate, even required, to hold some children in an inferior
education environment in order to improve that environment for
other children. It treats the better learners instrumentally, as a
means to serve the welfare of poorer learners.
The skimming argument might also be nonsensical in the same
way the lost-funding argument is. If there were any other way to
improve the learning environment for children in public schools
whose parents would not participate in the voucher program-for
example, by transferring huge amounts of money from other
government programs to the public school systems in order to
attract the very best teachers in the nation and to provide Cadillac
facilities and services 5 0-then it would make no more sense to blame

47.

See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG,

ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-

CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE

24-34 (2001); Russell W.

Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of
Student Composition on Academic Achievement in High School, 107 TEACHERS
C. REC. 1999, 2001 (2005).
48. See, e.g., Nancy E. Hill & Lorraine C. Taylor, Parental School
Involvement and Children's Academic Achievement: Pragmaticsand Issues, 13
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 161, 161-62 (2004); Chia-Lin Hsieh &
Jianping Shen, Is School Choice a Mechanism for Sustaining Change?
Implications from a National Survey, 75 CLEARING HOUSE 88, 90 (2001).
49. See

GREG FORSTER,

A

WIN-WIN SOLUTION: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

15 (2011) (summarizing results of nineteen studies).
50. Studies showing the importance of peers compare standard classrooms
with different demographic composition. They do not compare a standard
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vouchers for the worsened environment in public schools than to
blame the state's failure to shift huge amounts of money from
noneducation programs.
What is truly troubling, from a child-centered perspective, about
the fact that it is generally the parents who are wealthier (possibly
subject to a program's income cap) and more involved in their
children's lives who apply for vouchers is that the programs tend not
to benefit the children who need it the most. If the state chooses to
reduce funding for public schools when enrollment drops as a result
of vouchers, then the state does nothing to benefit these worst-off
children. My suggestion for addressing this phenomenon is to
eliminate parental initiative from voucher programs.
School
districts could identify the worst-off children, or those in greatest
need of transfer to a better school, by means of performance results
and recommendations from teachers and counselors. They could
then notify those children's parents that the children will be
transferring, at state expense, to a private school that the state has
scrutinized and found to be academically superior. A legislative
proposal to implement such an approach would, I believe, reveal
clearly the lack of genuine concern for children among most who
promote vouchers.
Conservatives would oppose the proposal
because it both makes the voucher program no longer about
parental choice and entails state approval of private schools, to
which they are viscerally opposed. Defenders of the public school
system, on the other hand, should like the idea of removing the most
difficult pupils from that system, but teachers' unions might
nevertheless oppose it because it could mean fewer union members
as public school enrollment declines.
III. A CHILD-CENTERED VIEW OF VOUCHERS
I reject adult-centered reasoning about education policy and the
constitutionality of vouchers. Children's educational interests are
objectively more important than any interests any adults have at
stake in the voucher debate; they are the only interests accurately
characterized as fundamental. "Parental rights" are a misnomer for
the fiduciary obligation imposed on them by the state as a condition
for enjoying the state-conferred benefit of parental status and
custody.51 Statist thinking that makes collective societal benefits
the determinant of education policy is likewise morally flawed,
entailing an instrumental view of children. My position emerges

classroom with a large percentage of disadvantaged children to alternative and
much more expensive forms of instruction resembling those given to children
with serious special needs-for example, with extraordinarily low child-toteacher ratios, high-tech learning aids, etc.
51. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare:
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents'Rights,82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1994).

WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 48

from a child-centered perspective--one focused on whether voucher
programs actually help any children get a better secular education
and whether such programs themselves harm any children-and it
rests on a more nuanced understanding of what private schools are
like and of the regulatory environment in which they operate. I do
not suppose that the state must fund children's schooling, but I
maintain that if the state chooses to do so it must extend the benefit
equally to all children who would benefit from it and must ensure
that by funding private schools it does not actually make some
children worse off.
The operating premise of voucher programs is that children will
leave, or avoid in the first place, bad public schools and instead
attend academically good private schools. The bad public schools
clearly exist, the state has many reasons to prefer that children
attend good schools, and for reasons given above there can be no
legitimate objection to the basic idea of the state's financial support
of underprivileged children's attendance at academically good
private schools, religious or nonreligious. In fact, children whose
parents place them in private schools are constitutionally entitled to
state funding of their secular education if that would substantially
improve their secular education. Otherwise the state violates their
right to equal treatment. 52 Though parents, as explained above,
have no right to state subsidizing of their choice of private school,
children do have an equality-based right to state subsidizing of their
schooling if the subsidy would improve their secular education,
because it is generally not their choice to be in a private school
rather than a public school, so they cannot be treated as having
waived a state-proffered benefit. Rather, it is a choice parents have
made using legally effective power the state has conferred on them.
Thus, I favor voucher programs that enable children to exit or
avoid bad public schools and to attend academically sound (as the
state sees it) private schools, as well as voucher programs that
enable resource-poor private schools to provide a substantially
better secular education. But it is the assumption about children
getting a better education as a result of vouchers that is
problematic. It has been, under most voucher programs, a step in
the dark that could be off a cliff. Undoubtedly, as to any very bad
public school, there are private schools that are not prohibitively
distant and that would provide children a much better secular
education. But there are likely also to be some very bad private
schools nearby, some of which parents choose out of ignorance or for
ideological reasons rather than based on knowledgeable comparison
of secular educational quality. The inattention most supporters of
voucher programs have paid to that demonstrably substantial
possibility is further reason for suspicion that they do not really

52.

See DWYER, supra note 1, at 148-68.
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much care about the fate of kids from the ghetto and that their
support arises from other motivations. They hope for studies that
show better average test scores for voucher students than for public
school students, but such results are not crucial to their position,
and when such a study appears, they manifest no interest in its
reliability or details-in particular, whether very strong
performance at some private schools is masking very poor
performance at others.
I am not interested in psychoanalyzing anyone; my aim is just
to get state actors to look hard at what the state is buying in the
private school sector, just as state agencies do when the state buys
real estate, employees, equipment, and medicines in the private
sector in order to operate a public health facility. Over the course of
the history of voucher programs, there has been some movement in
that direction. As explained below, a few of the current programs
have some accountability measures that might function to exclude
at least some bad private schools. However, all current voucher
programs entail, to varying degrees, a step into the dark and, for
some children, over a cliff.
In concrete terms, the problem with most programs is a lack of
regulatory strings to create academic accountability in private
schools receiving voucher students. This is in turn, more generally,
a reflection of the larger problem of lack of accountability in private
schools; states demand little or nothing from private schools as a
general matter, and those that have had voucher programs have not
added much or any substantive demands as a condition for
participation. With or without vouchers, states have relied on
supposed competition in the private market to determine quality,
and that is a mistake for the reasons given above-namely,
unsophisticated consumers and consumers whose illiberal ideology
generates criteria of selection that differ completely from those of
the state. The result is that most existing voucher programs are, to
an undetermined extent, harming some children instead of helping
them, which is morally and constitutionally unacceptable. 53
IV. WHAT PROGRAMS Now EXIST?
I limit discussion here to programs under which the state pays,
directly or indirectly, for children in regular education programs to
attend a private school. This leaves out charter schools and voucher
programs for special needs students. Those other types of "school
choice" programs raise different issues and require different
normative analysis.
The oldest traditional voucher programs are in Wisconsin and
Ohio, and they were originally limited to specific cities-Milwaukee

53. See id. at 183-210; infra notes 75-76, 121-31, and accompanying text.
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and Cleveland.5 4 As originally structured, those programs contained
no meaningful accountability measures.5 5 Wisconsin recently added
Racine, and Ohio has added a statewide program, EdChoice, to
subsidize transfer out of the state's worst schools.5 6 The D.C.
program is inherently limited to one city. Douglas County, Colorado
tried to launch its own voucher program in 2011, but it remains on
hold as of this Article's writing as a legal challenge works its way
through the state court system. 57
Programs in Indiana and
Louisiana were statewide from inception.5 8 In these straightforward
voucher programs, parents apply for a chit that they can use to
enroll their children in a participating private school. The schools
collect the chits and send them to the state department of education,
which in turn pays the private schools an amount of money based on
the number of chits. A larger number of states-Arizona, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia-subsidize private
schooling by partially or fully reimbursing parents for tuition
payments or any taxpayer for donations to a private school
scholarship fund via tax credit or deduction.5 9
Fallacy 8: Voucher programs do not entail state choice of which
private schools to fund. Reality: This proposition has been a key
aspect of courts' reasoning when they uphold voucher programs
against anti-religious-establishment-type challenges. 60 But it is
patently false. Every voucher program necessarily entails a state
decision as to which private schools are eligible to participate. As
explained below, existing programs do include some minimal
participation requirements, and those requirements amount to the
54. DWYER, supra note 1, at 19-20.
55. Id. at 176-80.
56. See ALEXANDRA USHER & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, KEEPING
INFORMED ABOUT SCHOOL VOUCHERS: A REVIEW OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND
RESEARCH 16 (2011).

57. See Karen Aug6, Colorado Appeals Court: Douglas County School
Voucher System Legal, DENV. POST (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com
fbreakingnews/ci_22691754/colo-appeals-court-dougco-school-voucher-system-is;
Choice Scholarship Pilot Program, DOUGLAS COUNTY SCH. DISTRICT,
https://www.dcsdkl2.org/strategicplan/choice/choicescholarships/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).

58. School

Voucher

Laws:

State-by-State

Comparison,

NAT'L

http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/voucher-law
-comparison.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
59. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1184 (2012) (providing for onehundred percent reimbursement of contributions to a "school tuition
organization"); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-29.16 (2009) (providing a tax credit of up
to $1000 for individuals and $2500 for married couples and a cap of seventy-five
percent of total tax liability for corporations); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.11S(1)
(West 2012) (allowing a credit equal to sixty-five percent of contribution to
scholarship fund); id. § 422.12(5)(b) (permitting a tax credit for parents' tuition
payments up to $250).
60. See, e.g., Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013).
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
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basis upon which the state chooses which schools to fund. Even if a
program contained no requirements for participating schools, that
would simply mean the state had decided that every single private
school in the covered geographical area is eligible. Moreover, with
both chit and parent reimbursement programs, state education
officials are directly aware of which particular private schools the
state is effectively paying to educate children, because it receives
chits from particular schools or is given the names of the schools
through tax returns. 6 1
Scholarship-fund tax credits or deductions create the
appearance of further distancing the state from the private schools
in which parents enroll children, but that is illusory.
The
scholarships consist at least partly of state money; the scheme
essentially allows taxpayers to designate use of some of the taxes
they owe for payment of tuition at private schools the state has
selected rather than for some other government program. 62 If
taxpayers are reimbursed, through a tax credit, for every dollar they
contribute to a private school scholarship fund, then the full amount
of the scholarship value is really state money. If there is only
partial reimbursement, by allowing a deduction for the amount of
the contribution or capping a credit, then the state share of the
scholarship value is equal to whatever reduction in taxes the
contributor experiences as a result of the deduction. With partial
reimbursement, the state essentially operates a partial matching
fund. And, so long as any portion of a voucher or tax program
entails state spending on private schooling, the state is responsible
for the consequences.
Donor tax credit programs appear to make decision making
entirely private because, unlike with vouchers and tax benefits for
parents, the state might never learn to which particular schools the
money is going. But the state does know that the money, which as
just explained is at least partly state money, is going to some private
school and thereby facilitating attendance of a child at a private
school. The state must either choose individual private schools at
which scholarships qualifying for the tax benefits must be used or
else implicitly choose every private school for inclusion in the
program by choosing to exclude none. That the state does not know
which particular private schools it is effectively subsidizing for any

61. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:4015(3)(a) (2012) (requiring
applicants for vouchers to identify the school a child will attend).
62. See Stephanie Saul, Public Money Finds Back Door to Private Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2012, at Al (describing a congratulatory ceremony for a
corporation that donated $650,000 to Pennsylvania's private school scholarship
program where the company got ninety percent of that donation back by way of
a tax credit, and noting that some taxpayers actually make money by donating
because they get back all or most of their donation via state tax credits and also
claim a charitable deduction on their federal tax returns).
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particular child does not relieve it of responsibility; in fact, it
arguably means the state is being even more irresponsible with its
63
spending than it is under other types of programs.
The essential causal role that state choice plays in all these
legislative schemes I include within the term "voucher programs"
would be evident to my teenage daughters, even if it escapes the
understanding of Supreme Court Justices. 64 If I give my daughters
money for the movies but limit them to one of three currently
playing movies, they know that I am paying for the movie, not them,
and that I have made a choice to subsidize those three particular
movies and no others. If I do not limit their choice of movie, then I
have implicitly approved use of my money to pay for any available
movie. If my daughters call me from school and say they need to
pay fifty dollars right away in order to get a yearbook (teenagers not
being known for excellence at advance planning.. .), and I tell them
to use their own money for now and get reimbursed by me when
they get home, they understand that I am the one who bought the
yearbook, having decided that it was a worthy use of my money.
Likewise, if my daughter is at basketball practice and calls to tell
me she needs fifty dollars right away for the team sneakers, but my
ex-wife is picking her up from practice rather than me, I would ask
whether her mother could give her the money now and get
reimbursed by me later. My daughter would understand that it was
I who paid for the sneakers, not her and not her mother, again based
on my decision that it is a worthy use of my money. If I agreed to
reimburse her mother for only half of the cost, my daughter would
understand that half of the money that paid for her sneakers was
my money. Finally, if they needed fifty dollars for a yearbook or
sneakers and they owed me fifty dollars from some previous
transaction, and I told them that instead of repaying that debt they
should just pay for the yearbook or sneakers themselves and call it
even, they would recognize that I had effectively paid for the

63. Id. ("Some states collect little information on the scholarship
organizations. When asked how many students switched from public to private
schools, Linda Dunn, policy analyst for the Georgia Department of Education,
said: 'We don't collect that data. We don't regulate them in any fashion."').
64. The Court's decision in Winn rested crucially on a supposition that no
state money goes to private schools as a result of a tax program in which
Arizona effectively reimburses taxpayers for all or part of their donations to a
private school scholarship program by giving them a tax credit for those
donations. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447
(2011). The Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Meredith v. Pence rested
crucially on the equally implausible premise that the state does not benefit a
business when it gives citizens money to purchase the business' services,
Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1227-28, a premise upon which churches could build
an argument for state-provided "worship vouchers" or, in more religiously
neutral terms, "private-organization ceremony vouchers."

2013]

NO ACCOUNTING FOR SCHOOL VOUCHERS

383

yearbook or sneakers. Such understanding does not require great
economic sophistication.
Thus, with every type of program I include within the
description of "voucher programs," the state knowingly directs some
public money to private schools explicitly or implicitly approved by
the state for the purpose of enabling parents to enroll their children
in those private schools rather than in public schools. As to all
programs, then, we should ask what, if anything, the state does to
ensure that this public money it is choosing to use to pay for private
schooling is actually used to give children a better secular education
than they would otherwise receive. Otherwise, it is difficult to
conceive of any legitimate justification for the program, and, beyond
that, the concern arises that the state is actually making some
children worse off educationally.
V. Is THERE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY?

Judicial analysis and scholarly and popular debate have paid
some attention to what conditions are imposed on private schools in
order for them to receive direct or indirect state subsidies-that is,
to be eligible for vouchers or in order for parents who enroll their
children in them to qualify for tax-system reimbursement or for
state-subsidized scholarships. 65 But the attention is superficial and
manifests little understanding of what it would take to ensure that a
school serves the ostensible purpose of the programs. One way of
determining whether any regulatory aspect of a voucher program
creates real accountability is to ask these two questions: First, are
there requirements for participation that do not also apply to
licensing of grocery stores? Second, are there requirements for
participation that would exclude a jihadist indoctrinatory academy
in which students do nothing but watch religious videos?
A. Most RegulationsAttached to Vouchers Apply Also to Grocery
Stores
Nearly all common conditions for participation in voucher
programs apply also to grocery stores, which illustrates how
irrelevant they are to academic quality. Schools must pass fire and
health codes. 66 That is important, but it is not related to
instruction.
Some programs require schools to demonstrate

65. Restrictions on eligibility for vouchers, such as a parental income cap or
a requirement that students have previously attended a failing school, are
normatively significant but not my focus in this Article. Courts and scholars
have paid greater attention to those restrictions than to accountability
measures.
66. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(2)(a)(5) (West 2012); see also D.C.
CODE § 38-1853.07(a)(4)(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring a certificate of
occupancy).
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financial viability 6 7 just as a grocery store might be required to
carry liability insurance. Participating schools might be required to
perform criminal background checks on potential employees and
exclude those convicted of certain crimes. 68 This, too, is necessary;
as with similar checks for butchers in a grocery store, such a
requirement helps to make customers safer. But it does nothing to
ensure that the employees who are hired do their jobs well.
Fallacy 9: Antidiscrimination rules for admissions are
important. Reality: What many involved in the voucher debate
Voucher
emphasize are antidiscrimination requirements. 69
programs in fact uniformly require that participating schools refrain
But this
from racial discrimination in accepting students.70
requirement likely has little significance in practice. Few, if any,
private schools in the United States have explicit racediscriminatory admissions policies, parents in any group who feel
unwelcome at a school are not likely to want to send their children
to that school anyway, and children would be unlikely to have a
positive experience in a school where they are not wanted. Thus,
although the possibility that vouchers would facilitate racial
71
segregation has been a legitimate concern of voucher opponents,
formally requiring equal opportunity for admissions is not going to
prevent that. The state would have to delve more deeply into the
atmosphere in a school seeking to participate, and would have to
enact a statutory rule requiring education agency officials to exclude
schools with a racially hostile environment. A prohibition on
racially discriminatory admissions practices has been an easy
concession for voucher proponents to make, precisely because
schools run by racists are unlikely to have an explicit policy

67. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 38-1853.07(a)(4)(C); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1002.421(2)(f) (West 2012).
68. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.421(2)(i); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 501
(2012).
69. See, e.g., Press Release, Mandy Simon, Am. Civil Liberties Union,
House Passes Troubling Bill Authorizing Fed. Funds for D.C. Sch. Vouchers
(Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/house-passes
-troubling-bill-authorizing-federal-funds-dc-school-vouchers.
70. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2402(B)(1) (Supp. 2012) (requiring
parents to swear that they will use state money to secure for their child
education in certain subjects); D.C. CODE § 38-1853.08(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-3(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:4021(2) (Supp. 2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(2)(a)(4) (West Supp.
2012); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-12.1(1) (repealed 1991).
71. See, e.g., The Century Found. Task Force on the Common Sch.,
Vouchers and Segregation, in PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE VS. PRIVATE SCHOOL
VOUCHERS 63, 63-64 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2003); Simon, supra note 69;
see also Schneider & Buckley, supra note 29, at 135 (discussing studies showing
that segregation results from a preference of minority-race parents to have their
children in school with others of the same race, as well as from such a
preference among some white parents).
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excluding children based on race. In any event, nondiscrimination
in serving customers is a restriction imposed also on grocery stores,
so it does not pertain to the content or methods of instruction in the
schools. The same is true of a rule prohibiting discrimination in
72
admissions based on religion.
These "grocery store regulation" aspects of voucher legislation
might incidentally exclude some schools that are educationally
inadequate.
Organizations operating schools in buildings that
cannot pass fire and health codes are likely to be shoestring
operations, scammers, or organizations with insufficient resources
to hire qualified teachers. If there are any schools that manifestly
discriminate in admissions based on race, they are likely to be run
by illiberal ideological extremists, and such persons are unlikely to
provide a type of education the state values. Nevertheless, the
foregoing regulations do not directly encourage, let alone ensure, a
good secular education for children. Commentators and courts have
manifested little appreciation for the fact that schools can comply
with general business regulations yet completely fail to provide an
73
adequate education, and in fact could affirmatively harm children.
B.

School-Specific Regulations
Fear of inadequate education in private schools is hardly an idle
concern; ethnographic work and news reports on private schools
have exposed both private schools run by scammers and private
schools that are indoctrinating institutions providing little secular
education. 74 No one would deny that schools participating in
existing voucher programs are extremely varied in size, experience,
funding, and institutional aims. 75
In addition, schools can
affirmatively harm children by, for example, psychologically abusing
them, stifling their cognitive development with aggressive
indoctrination, or simply wasting their time.7 6 It is ironic that so
much attention is paid to discriminatory admissions policies and
none to racist or sexist teachings imposed on children who are
admitted. Such teachings pose a much greater threat to children's
well-being than do discriminatory admissions policies, yet no
voucher program prohibits participating schools from teaching that
enslavement of Africans was appropriate and divinely ordained or
that females are inherently inferior to males and should aspire only

72. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 38-1853.08(a) (LexisNexis 2001).
73. See generally KAHLENBERG, supra note 47 (collecting a volume of essays
that are predominantly antivoucher yet make no mention of the possibility of
educational deprivation in private schools).
74. See DWYER, supra note 16, at 13-37.
75. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 62 ("Schools participating in the programs
range from elite private academies to small, inexpensive programs operating in
church education wings.").
76. See DWYER, supra note 16, at 37-44; DWYER, supra note 1, at 183-86.
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to serve men and to take care of a home. What, if anything, do
states require of the private schools they subsidize by way of
education?
With several existing voucher programs, the answer is
straightforward:
"nothing."
Arizona
forthrightly
rejects
accountability for its Arizona Empowerment Scholarship Accounts. 77
Its governing statute declares that the program "does not permit
any government agency to exercise control or supervision over any
nonpublic school" and that "[a] qualified school shall not be required
to alter its creed, practices, admissions policy or curriculum" as a
condition of participation. 78 The singular requirement for schools'
eligibility to receive Arizona's state-provided scholarships is that
they not discriminate among potential customers based on race, 79
one of the grocery store regulations discussed above.
New
Hampshire similarly disavows any intent to condition participation
in its Education Tax Credit program on compliance with any
curricular requirements or submission to any state evaluation of its
instructional program.8 0 Pennsylvania and Rhode Island simply
require nothing of private schools receiving state money via their
tax credit programs, without announcing that fact.8 1
Florida's
Tax
Credit
Scholarship
program
eschews
accountability to the state and instead aims to encourage
accountability to parents by requiring that participating schools
merely give annual student progress reports to parents, administer
at least one standardized test per year to students, and report each
student's test result to the student's parents.8 2 Oklahoma similarly
expects accountability only to parents, regardless of what any
particular parents' desires and expectations might be, by requiring

77. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 15-2404 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
78. Id. Indiana's voucher statutes similarly declare that:
[T]he department or any other state agency may not in any way
regulate the educational program of a nonpublic eligible school that
accepts a choice scholarship under this chapter, including the
regulation of curriculum content, religious instruction or activities,
classroom teaching, teacher and staff hiring requirements, and other
activities carried out by the eligible school[.]
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-1(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
However, as
discussed below, Indiana does, in fact, indirectly regulate participating schools'
educational program by demanding certain outcomes, measured by mandatory
standardized tests. Indiana's voucher law also specifies a number of topics and
moral principles that participating schools much teach. Id. § 20-51-4-1(f); id. §
20-51-4-3(a).
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2401(5). In addition, parents must agree to
secure "an education for the qualified student in at least the subjects of reading,
grammar, mathematics, social studies and science." Id. § 15-2402(B)(1).
80. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G:9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
81. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8703-F (West Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN.
LAws, § 44-62-2(5) (2010).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. §

1002.395(8) (West 2012).
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of schools participating in the Oklahoma Equal Opportunity
Scholarship Tax Credit program "academic accountability to
parents ... through regular progress reports."8 3
Other states
attempt to create at least an appearance of expecting private schools
to demonstrate something to the state in exchange for their
receiving public money, but for the most part it is only an
appearance.
1. PrivateAccreditation
Several programs require that participating schools be
"accredited" or "chartered." 4 However, what they all mean by this
is approval by a private school accrediting organization, of which
there are dozens, mostly religious, and voucher laws do not specify
the standards that such organizations must apply.
2. Teach Certain Subjects
Many states prescribe a list of subjects for all private schools,
independently of the voucher program,8 5 and some voucher program
regulations themselves set out a list of required subjects.8 6 With one
exception, however, general private school regulations and voucher
program regulations leave schools entirely free to teach the
prescribed subjects however they wish, including from an
ideologically distorted perspective and in an oppressively
authoritarian manner; they do not specify curricular materials or
pedagogical approaches that schools must use.
Iowa is unusual in going beyond a list of subject areas to specify
a great many specific topics that should be taught and in attempting
to dictate, to some degree, an approach or normative orientationspecifically, one that is cosmopolitan, egalitarian, and autonomy
promoting.8 7 Its tax credit program requires that participating

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.206(F)(5)(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2013).
84. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2A-l(2)(A) (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 2357.206(F)(5)(a); id. tit. 70, § 3-104.7 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.183.

439.28(D) (Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(2)(a)(7) (West 2004 & Supp.
2012); IND. DEP'T OF EDUC., INDIANA CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM:
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS-ELIGIBLE
SCHOOLS
6
(2012),
available at http://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/school-choice/2013.0318
-faqforschools.pdf; Member Associations, VA. COUNCIL PRIVATE EDUC.,
http://www.vcpe.org/pages.asp?pageid=109451 (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). To
participate in Ohio's statewide EdChoice program, a private school must be
"chartered." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.02(A), .10 (LexisNexis 2009). One
way of becoming chartered is by complying with various provisions in the state's
administrative code, but another independent basis is being accredited by a
private school association. See id. § 3310.10.
85. See DWYER, supra note 16, at 10-11.
86. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-1(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 256.11(2)-(5) (West 2012); id. § 422.11S(5)(b) (West 2011).
87. See, e.g., IOWAADMIN. CODE r. 281-12.5(5), (8) (2012).
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schools be accredited, and its school regulations require accredited
88
private schools to use "a multicultural, gender fair approach" to
8
9
instruction, incorporate "[g]lobal perspectives," teach subjects such
as social studies in a way that reflects the perspectives of women
and men and of people of different races, 90 design their curriculum
"to eliminate career and employment stereotypes," 91 and "apply to
all curricular areas the universal constructs of critical thinking,
complex communication, creativity, collaboration, flexibility and
adaptability, and productivity and accountability." 92 Whether and
how Iowa's education department enforces these "approach"
requirements is unclear, however. It seems to be left to subjective
opinion on the part of department employees who review schools'
curricular plans or do site visits. 93

It is significant, though, that

Iowa is the only state whose voucher laws mention promotion of
cognitive abilities.
3. Teach CertainAmount of Hours
Many states specify the minimum number of hours of
instruction that students must receive each year in any private
94
school or in a private school participating in a voucher program.
But, of course, no amount of bad instruction or noninstruction adds
up to a good education.
4.

Teacher Qualifications

A few programs require that participating schools employ only
teachers with a certain level of education, typically a bachelor's
degree and never more than that.95 However, a school might employ
only one teacher, the bachelor's degree could be from any college
anywhere, and the degree could be in a field unrelated to education
or to the subject a teacher purports to teach. Ohio statutes mandate
that the state education department accept as a sufficient basis for
teacher certification a "diploma" from a "bible college" or "bible
institute."96 Florida has an even weaker teacher-quality condition
for participation in its scholarship program; participating schools
must "[e]mploy or contract with teachers who hold baccalaureate or
higher degrees, have at least 3 years of teaching experience in public
or private schools, or have special skills, knowledge, or expertise

88. IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11; IOWAADMIN. CODE r. 281-12.5(8).

89.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 256.11.
281-12.5(256).

90. IoWA ADMIN. CODE r.

91. Id. r. 281-12.5(4).
92. Id. r. 281-12.5(17).
93. Id. r. 281-12.8(256).
94. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(2)(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012).
95. See D.C. CODE § 38-1853.07(a)(4)(F) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3301.071 (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(2)(a)(6).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 3301.071(A)(2).
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that qualifies them to provide instruction in subjects taught."97
Thus, a school need only employ as teachers people who have
"teaching experience" in any school anywhere, or else simply claim
that all their teachers have special skills or knowledge.
5. Administer Tests
A significant number of states require that students
participating in a voucher program take some of the same
standardized tests that public school students take and report the
results to the state education agency or to parents. 98 The great
majority of these states, however, never attach any consequence to
poor student performance. 99
Students need not achieve any
particular score on the assessment or improve on the assessment
from one year to the next in order for them or the school to continue
participating in the program. 100 The D.C. program rules appear to
leave to the discretion of agency officials which, if any, participating
schools will have to administer tests, 101 and otherwise require only
that organizations that operate schools periodically submit a report
to education officials on "the academic growth and achievement of
students participating in the program" (as the school operators see
it) and the high school graduation rates of students in the program
(which depends entirely on what the schools choose to require for
102
graduation).
Indiana attaches some consequence to poor test results, but it is
limited to denying a school the opportunity to accept new students;
the students who tested poorly can continue receiving state money

97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.421(2)(h) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:391.7 (2001); id. § 17-4015(7) (2012);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.0710 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); id. §§ 3310.03(D)(2),
3310.14, 3310.15(A)(3), (C), (D); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.28(D) (Supp. 2012);
WIs. STAT. ANN.

§

118.60(7)(e); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-11-11 (2012).

Iowa

requires private schools benefiting from its tax credit programs to administer
"valid and reliable student assessments," and appears to require that this
include at least one assessment in reading, math, and science that would make
possible a "comparison of the school ... students with students from across the
state and in the nation." IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-12.8(1)(f) (2012). They
might require reporting of retention and graduation rates as well. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.28(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.60(6m)(b).
99. Iowa allows schools to set their own criteria for successful outcomes.
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-12.8(1)(f).
100. See, e.g., Educational Choice Scholarship (EdChoice) Program:
Frequently Asked Questions for Nonpublic Schools, OHIO DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/GD/Templates/Pages/ODE/ODEDetail.aspx?page=3
&TopicRelationlD=667&ContentID=46196&Content=137093 (last visited Mar.
26, 2013) (assuring schools inquiring about participation that the law "does not
require that students achieve a specific level of proficiency").
101. See D.C. CODE § 38-1853.08(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
102. See id. § 38-1853.10(b)(1)(A), (B).
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to subsidize their attendance at a failing school.10 3 Its voucher law
provides that if a participating school has a grade of D or F "for two
(2) consecutive years, the department shall suspend choice
scholarship payments for one (1) year for new students,"10 4 if a
school has a grade of D or F "for three (3) consecutive years, the
department shall suspend choice scholarship payments for new
students... until the school" receives a C or higher "for two (2)
consecutive years," 10 5 and if a school receives an F "for three (3)
consecutive years, the department shall suspend choice scholarship
payments for new students ...until the school" receives a C or
higher "for three (3) consecutive years." 10 6 Given that a rating can
be made only after the school has been in operation and has received
vouchers for at least a year, there are no consequences in Indiana
for operating at an F level until after two years, and then the only
consequence is not being able to take on more scholarship students
than one already has. Once students have enrolled in a school using
a state-provided scholarship, the state will pay for them to remain
there indefinitely even if the school receives an F grade year after
07
year.1
Louisiana similarly makes a show of performance-based
accountability, but its protection against state payment for
educational deprivation in private schools is even weaker. First,
schools are subject to consequences only if they enroll ten or more
voucher students per grade.10 8 This currently means less than a
third of participating schools. 109 Left entirely free of evaluation,
therefore, are the many church-basement fundamentalist schools
that have fewer than fifty children in the entire school, or really any
school that simply chooses to allow only up to nine voucher students
per grade. Second, as to those schools that do enroll more than ten
voucher children per grade, there is no assessment of their
performance until the second year in which a school has collected
almost $9000 of state money per pupil, and at that point, if they are
103. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-9(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
104. Id. § 20-51-4-9(a)(1).
105. Id. § 20-51-4-9(a)(2).
106. Id. § 20-51-4-9(a)(3).
107. Id. § 20-51-4-9(a)(4).
108. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:11 (2001 & Supp. 2012) (leaving it to the
state education board to determine whether state-financed private schools have
"a sustained curriculum" of sufficient quality); id. § 17:4025 (Supp. 2012)
(same); John White, Accountability Is Key to Louisiana School Vouchers'
Success, TIMES PICAYUNE (July 24, 2012), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index
.ssf/2012/07/accountability-is keytolouis.html
(presenting
the
State
Superintendent of Education's vision for voucher school accountability).
109. See Mike Hasten, Questions Surround Louisiana's School Voucher
Program, TOWN TALK (July 29,
2012), http://www.thetowntalk.com
/article/20120729/NEWS01/207290346/Hasten-Questions-surround-Louisiana-sschool-voucher-program (estimating that seventy-five percent of participating
schools enroll fewer than forty voucher students).
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found to be failing miserably, the consequence initially is merely to
be precluded temporarily from accepting new voucher students. 110
The next possible consequence-disqualification from the programcan come only after four years of failing-that is, after collecting
state money for five years."' Therefore, Louisiana would pay for
children to be in a horribly deficient private school for five years
before it could decide no longer to pay for this denial of education to
those children. 112
Moreover, even this weak enforcement
mechanism could be eviscerated by an education agency decision to
base evaluation of private schools on the most dumbed-down tests
available, and Louisiana's Superintendent of Education is avowedly
opposed to state supervision of voucher schools, having proclaimed:
"[I]t's a moral outrage that the government would say, 'We know
what's best for your child'..... . 'Who are we to tell parents we know
better?'113

6. Submit to Evaluation by Public Officials
A few programs make participating schools susceptible to site
visits by state education officials, though they do not mandate that
such site visits occur for every participating school. 114 An important
question is whether a state's department of education actually has
the power and statutory mandate to exclude academically deficient
schools from the program. Voucher program regulations in Iowa
and Ohio state that if a private school is not in compliance with
statutory requirements or the education agency's standards, the
agency may withdraw accreditation from the school, but the
regulations do not require doing so.115
7. Other PerformanceMeasures
Wisconsin requires that participating schools meet one of the
following requirements: seventy percent of students advance one
grade level each year, the average attendance rate is at least ninety
percent, eighty percent of voucher students "demonstrate significant

110. White, supranote 108.
111. Id.
112. See Melissa S. Flournoy, Voucher Accountability: From Bad to Worse,
LA. PROGRESS (July 24, 2012), http://www.cloup.orgIWordPress/voucher
-accountability-from-bad-to-worse#.
113. See Simon, supra note 30.
114. See IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-3(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (directing
DOE officials to make random visits to five percent of participating schools each
year); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11(10) (West 2012) (outlining rules for
"accrediting" private schools providing that the state department of education
will create compliance standards and review schools periodically to determine if
they are satisfying the standards, and that participating schools must complete
"accreditation compliance forms" and submit to site visits); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
3301-11-11(A)(6) (2007).
115.

IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11(11)(d); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-11-11(B).
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academic progress," or seventy percent of families meet whatever
116
parent involvement standard the school might wish to establish.
Given that only one of these goals must be met, that schools may
establish their own bases for advancing students, that a high rate of
attendance does nothing to ensure good education while students
are present, and that parental involvement likewise has no inherent
connection to content or methods of instruction, this requirement
does nothing to promote accountability.
8.

Treatment of Students

The vast majority of programs impose no restrictions on
physical or psychological treatment of pupils. Iowa law prohibits
schools participating in its subsidized scholarship program from
using corporal punishment. 117 And its condition for participation
that a school must take a "gender fair"118 approach to instruction
might rule out sexist treatment of girls. Otherwise, states have
manifested no concern about sexist or oppressively authoritarian
forms of instruction. The D.C. program rules, in fact, explicitly
authorize participating religious schools to engage in sex
discrimination. 119
In sum, in any existing voucher program, illiberal
indoctrinatory academies and fly-by-night voucher opportunists
could participate, at least for some years. Undoubtedly, many such
schools are deterred from applying for participation in programs
that require administration of tests and publication of the results or
that require participating schools to submit to site visits. Iowa's
subject matter and approach requirements are so potentially
intrusive that they probably also scare off many bad private school
operators. Opportunists looking for easy money by luring in naive
parents are especially likely to try setting up shops instead in states
where there is not even the pretense of regulation. But a bad school
determined to get state money in its hands can succeed in any of the
programs now in operation.
There is, in fact, evidence of some schools that are, from a
secular perspective, bad schools being largely funded through state
voucher programs. For example, many religious high schools in
Georgia subsisting on state money use textbooks pervaded with
religious messages and misstatement of facts driven by religious
belief, such as an economics book teaching that "the Antichrist-a
world ruler predicted in the New Testament-will one day control
what is bought and sold."120 In a great number of participating

116. Wis.

STAT. ANN. §

118.60(7)(a) (West Supp. 2012).

117. IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.21 (West 2011).

118. Id. § 256.11 (West 2012).
119. See D.C. CODE § 38-1851.07(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
120. Saul, supra note 62.
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schools, creationism dominates the science curriculum. 121 Many
schools receiving funding from Georgia do not even provide
instruction for the ostensibly mandatory minimum 4.5 hours per
school day. 122 The press in Louisiana has uncovered a large number
of Christian schools that are prime beneficiaries of the state's
voucher program but that have neither the facilities nor the
inclination to provide a good secular education. 123 For example, the
state's education department approved for program participation the
New Living Word School, where children "spend most of the day
watching TVs in bare-bones classrooms" and lessons are thoroughly
infused with biblical messages, 124 having as its sole stated mission
"to provide a foundation built on biblical principles."'125 The school
almost tripled its enrollment by accepting voucher students, despite
not having the required teachers or space to accommodate more
students. 26 Louisiana's education department has also approved for
receipt of state money the Upperroom Bible Church Academy in
New Orleans, "a bunker-like building with no windows or
playground"; 27 the Eternity Christian Academy in Westlake where
elementary and middle school students "sit in cubicles for much of
the day and move at their own pace through Christian workbooks,
such as a beginning science text that explains 'what God made' on
each of the six days of creation," ignoring evolution because the
pastor/principle believes it best "to stay away from all those things
that might confuse our children";128 and other schools that "use
social studies texts warning that liberals threaten global prosperity;
Bible-based math books that don't cover modern concepts such as
29
set theory; and biology texts built around refuting evolution."'
Some studies of school choice programs have found that
voucher-using children in private schools actually did worse than
children in the local public schools on standardized testing, in both
math and reading, despite the self-selection that characterizes
voucher users. 130 A recent summary of research found that "there is
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little evidence that vouchers increase achievement for students who
utilize vouchers." 13 1 But preoccupation with these aggregate results
makes no more sense than does concern with studies of public
versus private average test results. A study showing voucher
students in a given program on the whole score slightly worse than
students in the local public schools should not lead to elimination of
the voucher program. Some children might have been much better
off educationally as a result of the program, and it would be
desirable for the state to continue supporting the schools where that
happened. Likewise, a study showing voucher students doing better
than their public school counterparts provides no reason to accept
the program as it is or to expand it. Regardless of the comparative
average performance of students in voucher schools, as a whole,
relative to students in public schools, the state should be identifying
as early as possible the voucher schools where children appear to be
doing worse. In fact, states with voucher programs should be
rigorously examining applicant schools before including them in the
programs to ensure as best they can that every child who receives a
voucher will be using it to attend an academically sound school.
CONCLUSION

Voucher programs are proliferating.
The lack of real
accountability is not troubling enough to a sufficient number of
people to prevent this from happening. 13 2 Probably most taxpayers
see the issue as a zero-sum game; the state will use their money
either at public schools or at private schools, and, without knowing
much about the private school universe, the taxpayer sees it as a
matter of indifference.
Liberals who truly wish to improve
education and who are willing to part ways with the teachers'
unions and their absolutist antivoucher position, 33 but who remain
skeptical about the motives of voucher proponents, need to focus on
uncovering the bad private schools that are receiving state money

http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/local-schools/article_4f083f0e
-59a7-1 le0-8d74-001cc4c03286.html.
131. RESEARCH FOR ACTION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL
VOUCHERS: FACTS, FIGURES AND A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH

(2010), available

at

http://www.researchforaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Educational
-vouchers-Facts-figures-and-a-summary-of-the-research.pdf; see also JOHN F.
WITTE

ET AL.,

THE

MILWAUKEE

PARENTAL

CHOICE PROGRAM LONGITUDINAL

13 (2010), available at
http:/! www.uark.edulua/der/SCDP[Milwaukee_Eval/Report_15.pdf (finding "no
significant differences in achievement growth in either math or reading
between students in MPCP or MPS").
132. But see Forman, supra note 25, at 589-90 (noting a study showing that
a large majority of the public supports attaching regulatory strings to vouchers
to ensure recipients provide a good education).
133. Moe and Hill perceive such a movement growing among Democratic
politicians. See Moe & Hill, supra note 2.
EDUCATIONAL GROWTH STUDY: THIRD YEAR REPORT

2013]

NO ACCOUNTING FOR SCHOOL VOUCHERS

395

and on pressing state officials to justify the educational deprivation
that children in those schools are suffering.
For their part, conservative voucher proponents should be
forced to explain if and why they oppose simple but effective
requirements for receiving public funding, such as (1) requiring any
applicant school that has been in operation for some years to
demonstrate either (a) past success, as evidenced by positive results
on good tests or by state educational officials' observing their
operations before approval, or (b) at least past adequacy and a high
likelihood of future success with additional resources (for those
schools that have the right aims and good administration but have
lacked resources); (2) requiring all applicant schools to submit for
preapproval an outline of curriculum and a list of texts to be used in
mandated subjects; (3) requiring participating schools to employ
only state-certified teachers and to have an appropriate facultystudent ratio (or at least as good as that in the local public schools);
(4) requiring participating schools to administer good tests (to all
their students or just to voucher students, at their election), report
the results to the state, and be excluded from participation if they do
not produce "passing" results fairly quickly; and (5) subjecting all
participating schools to an unannounced site visit at least once in
the first year of participation, to assess both adequacy of instruction
and proper treatment of students, requiring expeditious correction
of any problems, and doing follow-up visits and other forms of
monitoring as appropriate. Voucher proponents could not plausibly
argue that these requirements would be prohibitive for any
established private school that is capable of fulfilling the promise
vouchers are supposed to hold. And if they are hungry for some
studies showing clear benefits for children from voucher programs,
they might just get them if they would support programs that are
much more discriminating in qualifying private schools to
participate.

